In this paper, we study energy and mean-payoff timed games. The decision problems that consist in determining the existence of winning strategies in those games are undecidable, and we thus provide semi-algorithms for solving these strategy synthesis problems. We then identify a large class of timed games for which our semi-algorithms terminate and are thus complete. We also study in detail the relation between mean-payoff and energy timed games. Finally, we provide a symbolic algorithm to solve energy timed games and demonstrate its use on small examples using HyTech.
INTRODUCTION
Timed automata [1] , respectively timed games [33, 19] , are fundamental models to verify, respectively to synthesize controllers for, timed systems which have to enforce hard real-time constraints. Those models were introduced in the nineties and the underlying theory has since then been successfully implemented in efficient analysis tools such as Kronos [15] and UppAal [32] for verification, and UppAalTiga [4] for synthesis. The latter has been used to solve industrial case studies, e.g. [28, 20] .
Recently, there has been an important research effort to lift verification and synthesis techniques from the Boolean case to the quantitative case, see [26] and references therein. More specifically, lots of progress has been made recently on zero-sum two-player games played on weighted graphs, in which edges are decorated with costs or rewards, see for example [13, 22, 23, 18] , with the objective of setting up a framework for the synthesis of optimal controllers (see also [34] for applications in linear control systems). Important examples of such games are mean-payoff and energy games [13, 18, 23] . In those games, two players move a † NICTA is funded by the Australian Government through the Department of Communications and the Australian Research Council through the ICT Centre of Excellence Program.
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Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. token along the edges of a weighted graph whose vertices are partitioned into vertices that belong to player 1, and player 2 respectively. In each round of the game, the player that owns the vertex with the token chooses an outgoing edge and target vertex to move the token to. By playing in such a way, the two players form an infinite path through the graph. Player 1 wins the mean-payoff objective if the long-run average of the edge-weights along this path is nonnegative, and he wins the energy objective, if there exists a bound c ∈ Z such that the running sum of weights of the traversed edges along the infinite path never goes below c (this can model for example that the system never runs out of energy). As the games we consider are zero-sum, player 2 wins when he can enforce the complementary objectives. In the finite state case, the mean-payoff and energy objectives are inter-reducible, and this fact was used recently to provide algorithmic improvements to solve mean-payoff games [18] . Extensions of timed automata with costs and rewards have also been studied. In [3, 5] , timed automata are extended with continuous variables that are used as observers, and allow for modeling accumulation of costs or rewards along executions. The main motivation for studying those extensions is to offer an extra modeling power while avoiding severe intractability of richer models like hybrid automata. Indeed, it has been shown that the reachability problem for weighted/priced timed automata remains decidable [3, 5] , and more precisely PSPACE-c [8] , while the reachability problem is undecidable already for the class of stopwatch automata [21] (a simple class of hybrid automata). Also the existence of executions in a weighted automaton that ensure a bound on the mean-payoff can also be decided in PSPACE [10] . In this paper, we consider timed extensions of the important classes of mean-payoff and energy games. Example 1. Fig. 1 gives an example of an energy (turnbased) timed game. Eve (player 1) owns the left location and decides when to take the transition from left to right, while Adam (player 2) owns the right location and decides when to take the transition from right to left; x is a dense-time clock. Each transition resets the clock x, and when time elapses the energy level grows with derivative 3 in Eve's lo- cation and decreases with derivative 2 in Adam's location. In the remaining of this paper, we use the following conventions: plain (resp. dashed) arrows are Eve's (resp. Adam's) transitions; a location invariant is enclosed in brackets (e.g.
[x ≤ 2]) and must be satisfied by the valuation of the clocks when the control is in that location; when an edge weight is non zero, we attach it to the edge. Fig. 2 , left, depicts the initial energy levels that are sufficient for Eve in order to have a winning strategy against any strategy of Adam, i.e. to ensure an infinite execution in which the energy level never falls below 0. For instance, if the infinite game starts in Eve's location, then if the value of clock x is less than 2 3 , an initial energy level 0 is sufficient; for x > 2 3 , the initial energy level should be larger than or equal to 3 ⋅ x − 2. Similarly, the winning zone in Adam's location is depicted on the right hand side of Fig. 2 . The main purpose of this article is to propose algorithmic methods to compute such information.
Unfortunately, for weighted extensions of timed games, even the cost bounded reachability problem is undecidable [17] , and we show here that both mean-payoff and energy games are undecidable. This is unfortunate as such cost extensions of timed games are very natural and well-suited to model optimality problems in embedded control [20] . Nevertheless, we believe that the undecidability result should not be an end to the story and we study in this paper semialgorithms (completeness and/or termination is not guaranteed) to solve those two synthesis problems. We also identify a large class of timed games where our semi-algorithms are complete. To the best of our knowledge, there are the first positive results for those objectives on timed automata. There are related works in the literature but they apply to orthogonal classes of games, or to other objectives. Indeed, in [9] , it is shown that mean-payoff games are decidable for O-minimal hybrid automata, this class is different from the one identified here as timed automata are not O-minimal hybrid automata. In [30] , the authors study the average time per transition problem for turn-based timed games; their results do not apply to mean-payoff, nor to energy objectives.
Contributions. Our contribution is threefold. First, we study the relation between mean-payoff and energy timed games. As we already mentioned, in the finite state case, the mean-payoff and energy objectives are inter-reducible [18] : given a weighted game G, Eve wins the mean-payoff objective if, and only if, she wins the energy objective. We show here that the relationship between the two types of games is more complex in the timed case. We identify conditions under which it is possible to transfer winning strategies for one objective into winning strategies for the other objective, and we show that those conditions are also necessary. Those results are formalized by Thm. 1 and Thm. 2.
Second, Thm. 3 establishes the undecidability of the decision problems associated with energy and mean-payoff timed games. This result is unfortunate but not surprising (it was already conjectured in [7] , see page 89). This negative result motivates the main contribution of this paper: we propose two semi-algorithms for synthesizing winning strategies. We first consider a cycle forming game (in the spirit of [6] ) on the region graph associated with the underlying weighted timed game: the two players move a token on the region graph and the game is stopped as soon as a cycle is formed. In Sect. 3.4, we partition the set of simple cycles of the region graph into those that are good for Eve, those that are good for Adam, and those that are neither good for Eve nor for Adam. If the formed cycle belongs to the first set then Eve is declared winner of the cycle forming game, if the cycle belongs to the second then Adam is the winner, otherwise it is a draw. Thm. 4 establishes that if Eve wins the cycle forming game then she has also a winning strategy in associated energy games, and Thm. 5 proves a similar result for Adam. Then, we identify a class of weighted timed games, that we call robust, for which this reduction to the cycle forming game on the region graph is complete: in this case the good cycles for Eve and the good cycles for Adam partition the set of simple cycles of the region graph. This class covers the class of timed games where costs appear on edges only. Thm. 10 establishes the decidability of the membership problem for the class of robust weighted timed games.
Finally, as the cycle forming game is defined on the region graph, it does not lead to a practical algorithmic solution. This is why we propose in addition a symbolic semialgorithm to solve energy timed games. In Thm. 13, we show that our symbolic algorithm is also complete on the class of robust weighted timed games. In order to show the feasibility of our approach, we have implemented this algorithm as a script for HyTech [27] and ran it on small examples.
Our main theorems and their relation with the different classes of games we consider are depicted in Fig. 3 and 4 . Structure of the paper.
In Sect. 2, we define the mean-payoff and energy timed games. In Sect. 3, we develop semi-algorithms based on reductions to cycle games played on the region graph. In Sect. 4, we identify a class robust games, for which the reduction to cycle games is complete. In Sect. 5, we propose a symbolic semi-algorithm which is also complete for robust games.
Due to space constraints, most proofs have been omitted from this paper; they can be found in the full version [16] .
PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we first recall the definition of concurrent games. Then we review a useful result from [29] that defines a canonical decomposition of infinite paths in a graph into simple cycles. Next, we introduce weighted timed games, the semantics of which is given in term of infinite concurrent games. Starting from the notion of weight (or cost/reward), Winning strategies for Adam we define mean payoff and energy objectives. We close the section with a study of the relationships that exist between mean-payoff and energy objectives in timed games.
We let N be the set of natural numbers, Z the set of integers, R the set of reals and R+ the set of non-negative reals.
Concurrent Games
Definition 1. ( [2] ) A concurrent game between two players Eve and Adam is a tuple C = ⟨St, ι, Act, Mov, Tab, Ω⟩, where:
• St is the set of states;
• ι ∈ St is the initial state;
• Act is the set of actions;
Act ∖ {∅} gives for a state and a player the set of allowed actions, we let Mov(s) = {(a, b) a ∈ Mov(s, Eve), b ∈ Mov(s, Adam)};
• Tab ∶ St × Act × Act ↦ St is the transition function;
• Ω ⊆ (St ⋅ (Act × Act)) ω is the objective for Eve.
A concurrent game is finite if St and Act are finite. It is turn-based if in each state s, one of the players has only one allowed action.
A round of the game consists in Eve and Adam to choose independently and simultaneously some actions, say a∃ and a∀ respectively, such that a∃ ∈ Mov(s, Eve) and a∀ ∈ Mov(s, Adam). The pair m = (a∃, a∀) is an allowed move i.e. m ∈ Mov(s). By playing finitely (resp. infinitely) many rounds from state s ∈ St, the players build a finite (resp. infinite) path. Formally, a path is a finite or infinite sequence s0 ⋅ m0 ⋅ s1 ⋅ m1⋯s k ⋅ m k ⋯ of alternating states and moves, such that ∀i ≥ 0, mi ∈ Mov(si) and si+1 = Tab(si, mi). We also write a path as s0
The length, ρ , of an infinite path ρ is ∞ and the length of a finite path ρ with n moves (ending in sn) is n and last(ρ) = sn. We write ρn, n ≤ ρ , for sn, the n + 1-th state in ρ, and first(ρ) = ρ0 = s0. Given a path ρ = s0
→ ⋯, we write ρ≤n, n ≤ ρ for the prefix of ρ up to sn that is the finite path s0
A play is an infinite path in (St ⋅ (Act × Act)) ω , and a history is a finite path in (St ⋅ (Act × Act)) * ⋅ St. The set of plays from s is Play(C, s) and Play(C) = Play(C, ι). A play is winning for Eve if it belongs to the objective Ω.
Definition 2. (Strategies)
A strategy for Eve (resp. Adam) is a function which associates with a history h an Eve-action in Mov(last(h), Eve) (resp. an Adam-action). A pair of strategies (σ∃, σ∀) forms a strategy profile. Given a strategy profile, its outcome from state s, written Outs(σ∃, σ∀), is the unique play ρ such that: ρ0 = s and ∀n ≥ 0, ρn+1 = Tab(ρn, σ∃(ρ≤n), σ∀(ρ≤n)). Given a strategy σ∃ of Eve, its outcomes from state s, written Outs(σ∃), are the set of plays ρ for which there is a strategy σ∀ of Adam, such that ρ = Outs(σ∃, σ∀). A strategy σ∃ of Eve is winning, if for all strategies σ∀ of Adam, Outι(σ∃, σ∀) ∈ Ω; strategy σ∀ of Adam is winning, if for all strategies σ∃ of Eve, Outι(σ∃, σ∀) ∈ Ω.
Decomposition in Simple Cycles
In the sequel we will reduce energy and mean payoff games to games played on the region with cycles objectives. In this paragraph we recall the key results [29] related to the decomposition of a play into simple cycles. A history h = s0 ⋅ m0 ⋅ s1 ⋅ m1⋯sn is a cycle if s0 = sn, n ≥ 1. A simple cycle is a cycle such that for all i and j, 0 ≤ i < j < n, si ≠ sj. We write C(C) (C when C is clear from the context) for the set of simple cycles in the concurrent game C.
Every history h of a finite game can be uniquely decomposed into a sequence of simple cycles, except for a finite part. The decomposition process maintains a stack, st(h), of distinct states and moves. We write the stack content s1 ⋅ m1 ⋅ s2 ⋅ ⋯ ⋅ mn−1 ⋅ sn where s1 is at the bottom of the stack and sn the top. We use the notation s ∈ st(h) for s ∈ {s1, s2, ⋯, sn}. The decomposition, dec(h), is a set of simple cycles. We define dec(h) and st(h) inductively as follows:
• for the single state history s, dec(s) = ∅ and st(s) = s.
• let h ′ = h ⋅ m ⋅ s, m a move, s ∈ St, be a history.
-If s ∈ st(h), and
m⋅s).
Note that the stack always contains distinct elements, therefore only simple cycles are added to the decomposition. The elements in the stack from the bottom to the top, form a history s0 ⋅ m0 ⋅ s1 ⋅ m1 ⋯ sn, where n + 1 is the height of the stack. The decomposition of a play is the union of the decompositions of the finite prefixes of the play.
Weighted Timed Games
Let X be a finite set of variables called clocks. A clock valuation is a mapping v ∶ X → R+. We let R X + be the set of clock valuations over X. We let 0 X be the zero valuation where all the clocks in X are set to 0 (we use 0 when X is clear from the context). Given δ ∈ R+, v +δ denotes the valuation defined by (v+δ)(x) = v(x)+δ. We let C(X) be the set of convex constraints on X which is the set of conjunctions of constraints of the form x c with c ∈ N and ∈ {≤, <, =, >, ≥}. Given a constraint g ∈ C(X) and a valuation v, we write
Definition 3.
A weighted timed game [31] (WTG for short) is a tuple T = ⟨L, ι, X, T∃, T∀, Inv, w⟩, where:
• L is the (finite) set of locations and ι is the initial location;
• X is a finite set of clocks;
• T∃, T∀ ⊆ L × C(X) × 2 X × L are the set of transitions belonging to Eve and Adam respectively, and we let T = T∃∪T∀; An element of T∃ (resp. T∀) is an Eve-transition (resp. Adam-transition).
• Inv∶ L → C(X) defines the invariants of each location;
• w∶ L ∪ T → Z is a weight function assigning integer weights to locations and discrete transitions.
If, from each location, all the outgoing transitions belong to the same player, T is said turn-based.
Informally, a WTG is played as follows: a state of the game is a pair ( , v) where is a location and v is a clock valuation such that v ⊧ Inv( ). The game starts from the initial state ( ι, 0). From a state ( , v), each player p ∈ {Eve, Adam} chooses (independently) a timed action ap = (dp, ep) where dp ∈ R+ and ep = ( , g, Y, ′ ) is a p-transition. The intended meaning is that p wants to delay for dp time units and then fire transition ep. There are some restrictions on the possible choices of timed actions (dp, ep): 1) dp must be compatible with the current state ( , v) and location invariant, i.e. for all 0 ≤ d ′ ≤ dp, v + d ′ ⊧ Inv( ); 2) ep must be enabled after dp time units, i.e. v + dp ⊧ g; 3) the target location's invariant must be satisfied when entering this location, i.e.
[Y ← 0](v + dp) ⊧ Inv( ′ ). A timed action satisfying these restrictions is said legal. If from a given state, one player has no legal timed action to play (i.e. no discrete action is enabled in the future for this player), it plays a special action . At each round of the game, players propose some actions, a∃ for Eve, and a∀ for Adam. Either a∃ is a legal action for Eve; or there are no legal actions for Eve and a∃ = . Similarly for a∀. We assume that from any reachable state of the game, at least one player has a legal action, hence the pair ( , ) is never proposed.
To determine the effect of a joint action, we select the player p that chooses the shortest delay dp. In case both players choose the same delay, the convention is that Adam is selected (this is without loss of generality and other policies can be accommodated for). These informal game rules are formalized in the next section.
Semantics of Timed Games
Given a timed action (d, e) ∈ R+ × T with e = ( , g, Y, ′ ), a state ( , v), the successor state in the WTG is (
which accounts for a combined delay transition of d time units followed by the discrete step firing edge e. The duration of this transition is d(( , v)
the semantics of the WTG T is the (infinite) concurrent game C(T , Ω) = (St, ι, Act, Mov, Tab, Ω) defined by:
• the set of states is St = L × R X + and the initial state is ι = ( ι, 0);
• the set of actions is Act = Act∃ ∪ Act∀, where Act∃ = R+ × T∃ are the actions for Eve and Act∀ = R+ × T∀ are the actions for Adam;
• Mov(s, Eve) ∈ 2 Act ∃ ∖ {∅} ∪ { } is the set of legal actions for Eve in s if there is at least one, or { } otherwise; and Mov(s, Adam) is defined similarly. Given (a∃, a∀) ∈ Mov(s, Eve) × Mov(s, Adam), we define Mov(a∃, a∀) as follows:
-if a∃ = (resp. a∀ = ) then Adam (resp. Eve) is selected and Mov(a∃, a∀) = a∀ (resp. Mov(a∃, a∀) = a∃);
-otherwise a∃ = (d∃, e∃) and a∀ = (d∀, e∀) and:
• Given two actions a∃ and a∀, Tab(( , v), a∃, a∀) = (
→ sn⋯ be a finite or infinite path in C(T , Ω). The duration and reward of h are respectively:
A strategy σ is immune from Zenoness if all its outcomes are non-Zeno. A game is said to have bounded transitions if there is a bound D, such that for all states ( , v), actions
Mean-payoff and Energy Objectives
The mean payoff (per time unit) of a play is defined as the long-run average of reward per time unit. Formally, the mean payoff of a play ρ is:
.
Definition 4.
We consider the following types of games:
• The mean payoff game TMP associated with a WTG T , is the game played on T where the objective (for Eve) is to obtain a non-negative mean payoff: i.e. TMP = C(T , ΩMP) where ΩMP = {ρ ∈ Play(C) MP(ρ) ≥ 0}.
• Given an initial credit c ≥ 0, the c-energy game T E(c) associated to a WTG T , is the game played on T where the objective Ω(c) is to maintain the reward of every prefix of every play above −c:
where Ω(c) = {ρ ∈ Play(C) ∀n ∈ N. c + w(ρ≤n) ≥ 0}.
• The energy game associated with a WTG T , is the game C(T , Ω E ) where the objective is Ω E = ∪c≥0Ω(c).
Decision problems. For each type of games, we define the associated decision problem:
• Mean-payoff : Given a mean payoff game TMP, is there a winning strategy for Eve in TMP?
• c-energy: Given a c-energy game T E(c) , is there a winning strategy for Eve in T E(c) ? •
We also consider the following related problem:
• Unknown initial credit: Given a WTG T , is there a credit c such that Eve has a winning strategy in T E(c) ?
We also consider these problems from Adam's point of view.
To conclude this section we study the relations between mean payoff and energy games and state that all decision problems we have defined are undecidable for WTG.
Relations Between Mean-payoff and Energy Objectives
Obviously, if for some c the c-energy game is won by Eve, then the energy game is also won. In the other direction, if Adam has a winning strategy for the energy game then it is also winning for any c-energy game. In the finite state case the problem of energy and unknown initial credit are equivalent [18] : if Eve has a winning strategy for the energy game she has a memoryless one, and there is a bound on the maximum energy consumed by the outcomes of that strategy. This is not the case in general for WTG as demonstrated by the WTG B of Fig. 5 , for which Eve wins the mean-payoff game and the energy game, but no c-energy game.
While energy and mean-payoff objectives are inter-reducible in the finite state case [18] , the relationships between the two classes of objectives, formalized in the next two theorems, is more subtle for weighted timed games. Theorem 1. Let T be a WTG. If Eve has a winning strategy σ∃ in the energy game T E and σ∃ is immune from Zenoness, then σ∃ is a winning strategy in the mean payoff game TMP.
Example 2. The following example shows that if we do not have immunity from Zenoness, the property no longer holds. In the game of Fig. 6 , any play is winning for Eve in the c-energy game if c > 1. However, the total delay of a play is always smaller or equal to 1, hence the mean-payoff is smaller than −1, which means that Eve is losing.
We let T +δ be the game T in which we increase the weights of all locations by δ ∈ R. Formally T +δ is the WTG ⟨L, ι, X, T∃, T∀, Inv, w +δ ⟩, where: 1)
Theorem 2. Let T be a WTG. If there exists δ > 0, such that Adam has a winning strategy σ∀ in the energy game T +δ E which is immune from Zenoness, then σ∀ is a winning strategy in the mean payoff game TMP.
Example 3. The following example shows that if we do not add this δ to the weight of locations, the property no longer holds. In the game of Fig. 7 , for any initial credit c, Adam wins the c-energy game T E(c) . However Eve has a winning strategy in the mean-payoff game TMP. She has to choose a delay which increases fast enough so that the weight of the play is small compared to its duration. For instance, if at the n-th step of the game, she chooses to delay for n 2 time units, the average weight of the play will be greater than − 1 n . Hence it converges towards 0 and the mean-payoff is 0. Notice that if we add a small positive δ to the weight of each location, then following the same strategy, Eve also wins the c-energy game T E(c) for c greater than As already announced in the introduction, all the decisions problems that we have defined on weighted timed games are undecidable. The following theorem can be established (details are given in the full version of this paper) using variants of techniques used in [17, 14] :
Theorem 3. The mean-payoff, c-energy, energy and unknown initial credit problems are undecidable for WTG.
A SEMI-PROCEDURE USING REGIONS
In this section, starting from the classical notion of regions [1] , we define a finite concurrent game that exploits the relationship between timed paths and their projections in the region graph. We identify simple cycles in the region graph that are good for Eve (they roughly correspond to fragments of timed paths with positive reward), and others that are good for Adam (they roughly correspond to fragments of timed paths with negative reward). Thm. 4 tells us that if Eve can force to visit only her good cycles in the region graph then she has a winning strategy in the original energy timed game, and Thm. 5 is a symmetric result for Adam. To formalize those results, we need the notion of quasi-path: when we decompose a timed path according to simple cycles of the region graph, we introduce jumps inside regions because we remove a fragment of a timed path that starts inside a region and ends up in a possibly different state of the same region. Finally, we show how to solve the cycle forming game. This reduction is not complete: there are games which have winning strategies for Eve (or Adam) that our procedure will not find. However, we identify in Section 4 a class of games for which this reduction is complete.
Regions
We first recall the classical notion of regions [1] . If k ∈ N, we write C k (X) for the set of constraints in C(X) in which constants are integers within the interval ⟦0; k⟧. Let T be a WTG, and let M = max{c x ∼ c is a constraint in T }. For δ ∈ R+, we write ⌊δ⌋ the integral part of δ and fr(δ) its fractional part. The equivalence relation ≡ X,M over R + . An equivalence class is called a region. It is well known that this partition has the following properties: 1) it is compatible with the constraints in C M (X), i.e. for every r ∈ R X,M , and constraint g ∈ C M (X) either all valuations in r satisfy the clock constraint g, or no valuation in r satisfies it; 2) it is compatible with time elapsing, i.e. if there is v ∈ r and t ∈ R+ such that v + t ∈ r ′ , then for all v ′ ∈ r there is t ′ such that v ′ + t ′ ∈ r ′ ; 3) it is compatible with resets, i.
A region r is said to be time-elapsing, if for any v ∈ r there is t > 0 such that v + t ∈ r. We write Succ(r) the successors of r by time elapsing, it is defined by r ′ ∈ Succ(r) if there is v ∈ r and t ≥ 0 such that v + t ∈ r ′ .
Region Game
Given an objective Ω ⊆ ((L × R X,M ) ⋅ Act) ω , the region game associated with a WTG T = ⟨L, 0, X, T∃, T∀, Inv, w⟩ is the concurrent game R(T , Ω) = ⟨St, ι, Act, Mov, Tab, Ω⟩ where:
• St = L × R X,M and ι = ( ι, 0) is the initial state;
• Act is the set of actions. They are either or of the form (r, e, a) where r ∈ R X,M , e ∈ T∃ ∪ T∀ is a transition, and a ∈ {head; tail}; intuitively, an action is a target region (abstract delay) and a discrete transition. The extra component in {head; tail} is needed to determine who plays first when the two players choose the same abstract delay (target region).
• Let s = ( , r). Action (r ′ , e, a) belongs to Mov(s, Eve)
If there are no such action then only is allowed and this is the only situation in which is allowed.
• Let s = ( , r) and (r∃, e∃, a∃) ∈ Mov(s, Eve), (r∀, e∀, a∀) ∈ Mov(s, Adam). s ′ = Tab(s, (r∃, e∃, a∃), (r∀, e∀, a∀)) is defined as follows:
-if r∃ ≠ r∀, one region is a strict (time abstract) predecessor of the other (as they are both successors of r). If r∃ is a strict predecessor of r∀, Eve's action (r∃, e∃, a∃) is selected and otherwise Adam's action (r∀, e∀, a∀) is selected.
-otherwise r∃ = r∀ and two cases arise: 1. either r∃ is not a time-elapsing region: in this case Adam's move is selected; 2. or r∃ is a time-elapsing region; which move is selected then depends on the extra components a∃, a∀ ∈ {head; tail}: if a∃ = a∀ then Eve's move is selected and otherwise Adam's move is selected.
Once an action (r ′ , e, a) with e = ( , g, Y, ′ ) is selected, the resulting state is s
Remark 1. In case T is turn-based, then in each state of R(T , Ω) only one player has a choice. The region game can then be seen as a (classical) turn-based finite game. Example 4. We want to reduce the problem of finding winning strategies in a WTG to an equivalent problem in the region game. To illustrate the need for the extra component in the actions (i.e. a ∈ {head; tail}) consider the example of Fig. 9 . In the WTG (left), Eve has no winning strategy to win the mean payoff game: Adam can always choose a delay shorter than her from 0 to enforce location 2. For the same reason Adam has also no winning strategy. In the region game (right), we abstract away from the actual delays Eve and Adam can propose: they have only one possible choice which is to propose to delay up-to region 0 < x < 1. To reproduce the possibility that either Eve or Adam are able to propose the smallest delay, we use the choices of both players in {head, tail}.
head, head tail, tail head, tail tail, head Figure 9 : A WTG T and its associated region game.
Quasi Paths
A quasi path in a WTG is a sequence of states and transitions ρ = ( 0, v0)τ0( 1, v1)τ1⋯τn−1( n, vn) such that for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n−1 either: 1) τi is a move (a∃, a∀) and
In that case τi is called a jump. We will denote jumps by ↷. A quasi cycle is a quasi path such that ( n, [vn] 
In order to extend the reward to quasi paths, we need a weight function δ ∶ L × R X,M ↦ R which attributes a weight to jumps according to the region in which they happen. We define w δ the reward for each transition τi, depending on its type: 1) if τi is a move (a∃, a∀) and ( i, vi)
We define a projection from quasi paths to paths in the region game by forgetting jumps and projecting each state to its associated region. Formally, the projection π is defined inductively:
where ap = (dp, ep) for p ∈ {Eve, Adam}, b∃ = ([v+d∃], e∃, head), and b∀ = ([v + d∀], e∀, head) if d∃ < d∀ and b∀ = ([v + d∀], e∀, tail) otherwise. It is naturally extended from histories to plays: ρ ′ is the projection of ρ if for all finite prefixes h of ρ, π(h) is a prefix of ρ ′ . If h is a path in the region game, the path ρ is said compatible with h if π(ρ) = h, and we write γ(h) for the set of path compatible with h.
Reduction to the Region Game
Given a weight function δ ∶ L × R X,M ↦ R, we will write C + δ for the set of simple cycles in the region game that only correspond to quasi cycles rewarding more than δ if δ is positive and more than 0 otherwise. Formally 1 :
. Given a real number ε > 0, we write C −ε δ for the simple cycles of the region game that correspond to quasi cycles with weight lower than δ and lower than −ε. Formally 2 :
, −ε}}. The winning condition of the region game will be given by cycle objectives. The intuition behind the definition of these objectives, is that if Eve can force the play to see only cycles with positive reward (i.e. in C + δ ), the accumulated weight will be positive, except for a finite part. Which means she is winning the c-energy game, if c is big enough to cover the loss of energy in this finite part.
In the region game, we will consider the cases where the objective of Eve is given by Ω
That is, she wins for plays whose decomposition in simple cycles only contains positive cycles.
Given a WTG T , let W T = min t∈T {w(t)} ∪ {0} and WL = min ∈L {w( )} ∪ {0}.
Theorem 4. Let T be a WTG, if Eve has a winning strategy in R(T , Ω + δ ) then: 1) she has a winning strategy τ∃ in the energy game T E ; 2) if T has bounded transitions, τ∃ is a winning strategy in the energy game T E(c) for the initial credit c = L × R X,M ⋅ (WL ⋅ D + W T ); 3) if τ∃ is immune from Zenoness, then it is winning in the mean payoff game TMP.
Remark 2. We made the hypothesis that there exists a bound on the duration of transitions in order to get the result for the unknown initial credit. Consider the example of Fig. 5 . In this game, Eve is winning in the region game for Ω + δ , and therefore by Thm. 4 she also wins in the energy game T E , by Thm. 1 she also wins the mean-payoff game TMP if we consider a strategy that is immune from Zenoness. However, the transition going out of 0 can be taken by Adam at any moment, its duration is not bounded. Indeed, whatever the initial credit is, Adam can force a play which costs more than this credit, by delaying the transition for long enough. Therefore Eve has no winning strategy for any fixed initial credit and the answer to the unknown initial credit problem is negative.
We now consider the objective for Eve:
That is, she wins if the decomposition in simple cycle contains at least on simple cycle that is not below −ε.
Theorem 5. Let T be a WTG, if Adam has a winning strategy in R(T , Ω −ε δ ) then 1) he has a winning strategy in the energy game T E ; 2) if T has bounded transitions, then Adam has a winning strategy in the mean payoff game TMP.
Solving the Region Game
We now show how to solve a finite game with objective of the form Ω = {ρ ∀c ∈ dec(ρ).c ∈ C W } or Ω = {ρ ∃c ∈ dec(ρ).c ∈ C W }. We can then apply this technique to solve the region game. To do so we unravel the game, and stop as soon as a cycle is formed. The play is then winning if the cycle formed belong to C W . This technique is adapted from [6] .
Definition 5. Let G = ⟨St, ι, Act, Mov, Tab, Ω⟩ be a concurrent game with Ω = {ρ ∀c ∈ dec(ρ).c ∈ C W } or Ω = {ρ ∃c ∈ dec(ρ).c ∈ C W }. The unraveling of G, written U(G), is the tuple ⟨St ′ , ι, Act, Mov
• the set of states is St ′ = {h ∈ (St ⋅ (Act × Act)) * ⋅ St ∀i, j ≠ i. hi ≠ hj} ∪ {↑, ↓}, the set of histories of the original game where all states appear at most once; with the addition of a winning state ↑ and a loosing state ↓ for Eve;
• for an history h and a move (a∃, a∀), let s = Tab(last(h), a∃, a∀):
otherwise, let i be such that hi = s, and c = h≥i a ∃ ,a ∀ → s (notice that such a i is unique): if c belongs to C W then Tab ′ (h, a∃, a∀) =↑ and otherwise Tab ′ (h, a∃, a∀) =↓. Then, from ↑ and ↓, there are only self loops, thus Tab ′ (x, a∃, a∀) = x for x ∈ {↑, ↓}.
• the objective is to reach ↑, i.e.
Theorem 6. Let G be a concurrent game and U(G) its unraveling. Then Eve has a winning strategy in the unraveled game U(G) if, and only if, she has a winning strategy in G.
Theorem 7. Given a finite concurrent game G with objective Ω = {ρ ∀c ∈ dec(ρ).c ∈ C W } or Ω = {ρ ∃c ∈ dec(ρ).c ∈ C W } where C W is given by an automaton, deciding if Eve has a winning strategy is PSPACE-complete.
ROBUST GAMES
The reduction to the cycle forming game in the region graph is complete when there exists a weight function δ, that partitions the set of simple cycles of the region into good ones for Eve and good ones for Adam.
Definition 6. (Robust game)
δ for some ε. We simply call a WTG robust when there exists δ ∶ R X,M ↦ R such that it is δ-robust.
Remark 3. Note that a WTG G where all the costs are discrete (i.e. ∀ ∈ L. w( ) = 0) is robust for δ = 0 and ε < 1. The results of this section implies decidability of the energy problem and mean payoff problem for this class.
Remark 4. If T is robust, then the leafs of U(R(T )) are partitioned between winning for Eve and winning for Adam. If, in addition, this game is turn-based, then it is determined. By Thm. 4 and Thm. 9, we can conclude that if T is robust and turn-based then the energy game T E is determined. Now, we establish that in a robust WTG, we can decide if Eve can win the energy game. This is a consequence of the following theorem which complements Thm. 4. A symmetric result also holds for Adam.
Theorem 8. Let T be a δ-robust WTG: 1) if Eve has a winning strategy in the energy game T E then she has a winning strategy in U(R(T , Ω + δ )); 2) if T has bounded transitions and Eve has a winning strategy in the mean payoff game TMP then she has a winning strategy in U(R(T , Ω + δ )).
Theorem 9. Let T be a δ-robust WTG: 1) if Adam has a winning strategy in the energy game T E , then he has a winning strategy in U(R(T , Ω −ε δ )); 2) if T has bounded transitions and Adam has a winning strategy in the mean payoff game TMP, then he has a winning strategy in U(R(T , Ω −ε δ )).
Given a weighted timed game, it is decidable whether this game is robust or not. Additionally, we present several complexity results about this problem in the full version of this paper.
Theorem 10. The membership problem for the class of robust game is decidable.
Finally, we can characterize the complexity of deciding the energy problem for robust weighted timed games:
Theorem 11. The energy problem for robust games is in EXPSPACE and is EXP-hard.
Proof Sketch. The algorithm proceeds by constructing the region game and then solving it using the algorithm of Thm. 7. This is correct because of Thm. 4, 6 and 8.
FIXPOINT ALGORITHM
While the reduction to the cycle forming game in the region graph is elegant and allows us to identify a large and natural class of weighted timed games with decidable properties, this reduction does not lead directly to a practical semi-algorithm. In this section, we design a valuation iteration algorithm that can be implemented symbolically using polyhedra, which can be executed on any weighted timed game, and find winning strategies for Eve when it terminates successfully. We also show that termination is guaranteed on robust weighted timed games.
Value Iteration Algorithm
Our value iteration algorithm is an adaptation of the solution for the finite state case described in [18] to the setting of WTG. It computes successive approximations of the minimal energy level that Eve needs to win the energy game.
Essentially, the semi-algorithm is based on the iteration of an operator that computes successive approximations of the energy level/credit that is necessary for Eve to maintain the energy level positive for k rounds in the energy timed game, where k increases along with the iterations. Most importantly, our algorithm is parameterized by a value c ∈ N, that represents a maximal energy level that we want to track: if the energy level necessary to stay alive from a given state (l, v) for k rounds is larger than c then ( , v) is considered as loosing. This is a sound approximation when looking for winning strategies. This parameter is important to enforce termination of the analysis. If a fixed point is reached, then it contains enough information to identify winning states (those that are not mapped to +∞ by the operator) and construct winning strategies. If the analysis is negative (no winning strategy found) then this value can be increased. Furthermore, we show that for robust weighted timed games, there is a finite value c which is computable and sufficient to detect winning strategies for Eve.
In this section, we assume the WTG is fixed and transitions, weight functions, etc . . . refer to this game. Given c ∈ N, we write a ⊖c b for max(0, a − b) if a − b ≤ c and +∞ otherwise.
In the sequel we consider mappings in S = [St ↦ R+ ∪ {+∞}] that associate with each state an element in R+ ∪ {+∞}.
Given c ∈ N, the operator liftc ∶ S ↦ S is defined by:
We let f In the case of robust game, we show that we can stop the algorithm after a finite number of iterations.
Theorem 13 (Termination). Let T be a WTG and c a fixed credit. If T is δ, ε-robust and f
Eve has a winning strategy in the energy game.
If moreover the game has bounded transition, the algorithm is complete.
Theorem 14 (Completeness for robust games).
Let T be a robust WTG, which has bounded transitions, and c = L×R X,M ⋅(WL ×D +W T )+1. Eve has a winning strategy in the energy game T E(c) if, and only if, f c n 0 ≠ +∞.
Symbolic Algorithm
We have implemented the previous value iteration algorithm in HyTech [27] . The implementation is based on the symbolic controllable timed predecessors operator defined in [11] and first implemented in HyTech for cost optimal reachability games [12] . The choice of HyTech compared to state-of-the-art hybrid systems' analyzers like PHAVer [24] or SpaceEx [25] is motivated by the fact that HyTech has a built-in script language in which we can define the symbolic controllable predecessors operator easily. The symbolic algorithm/program in HyTech for the example of Fig. 1 is given in the full version of this paper. The result of the computation for the value iteration algorithm with c = 4 is depicted on Fig. 2 and show the winning zones for Eve in locations Eve and Adam.
The value iteration algorithm is implemented as the iterative computation of the fixpoint of a safety hybrid game. The hybrid game has a special variable E, the energy variable which is the only variable that is not a clock. Each location of the original WTG has a counterpart location H in the hybrid game. If w( ) = k ∈ Z then the derivative of E in H is given by
′ ) of the WTG also has a counterpart transition ( , g, z ∧ E ∶= E + k, ′ ) if w( , g, z, ′ ) = k. A state of the hybrid game is thus defined by (( , v), E) where ( , v) is a state of the original WTG. The existence of a winning strategy for the c-energy game T is reduced to the existence of a winning strategy in the associated hybrid game for the safety objective E ≥ 0 (in each location.) Let Safe = {(( , v), E) 0 ≤ E ≤ c}, where the upper bound c is the one used in the lift function from subsection 5.1. We define the winning states of the safety hybrid game as the greatest fixpoint of: X = Safe ∩ Predt(Up(cPred(X)), uPred(X))
where cPred (controllable predecessor), uPred (uncontrollable predecessor), Predt (temporal predecessor) are defined as in [11, 12] and Up(Y ) = {(( , v), e ′ ) ∃(( , v), e) ∈ Y ∧ e ′ ≥ e}.
The Up operator captures in our symbolic implementation the role of the bound c in the liftc operator: indeed, while the set Xi contains only triples (( , v), e) where e ≤ c, it is clear that we must include in Xi+1 triples (( ′ , v ′ ), e ′ ) from which Eve can force in one round the upward closure (for the energy level) of safe states in i steps. This is because if Eve can win from ( , v) with a given energy level then she can win from that state with any greater energy level.
Example 5. In Fig. 10 , plain (resp. dashed) arrows are controllable (resp. uncontrollable) edges. In location 0, no task is scheduled and the (battery) energy is recharging at rate +3. There is a background task B to be run at least every 2 t.u. if the other task has not arrived (and actually running in location 1) and a sporadic task S (interrupt) that can happen any time. The task B can be scheduled from location 0 (this is controllable) and we can stop to run it after at least 1 t.u. (measured by clock x.) The background task B has less priority than S and if S happens it is scheduled and B preempted. If we schedule the background task B, we are rewarded by +2 energy units. In locations 0, 1, the sporadic task S can occur (uncontrollable) and in this case it must be scheduled (going to 2) which consumes energy at rate −α. The execution time of S is at most 1 t.u. (measured by clock x) and successive occurrences of S must be separated by at least 2 t.u. (measured by clock y.)
On this example, our symbolic algorithm terminates. If α = 3, the HyTech program (in the full version of this paper) gives a minimal initial energy level of 3 to be able to win the game (notice that we start with y = 2 and thus the sporadic task can arrive at the initial instant.) The optimal strategy from the point of view of Adam is to trigger the sporadic task S as often as possible. While a winning strategy for Eve (scheduler) is to wait in location 0 as long as possible. If the sporadic task arrives again, it is not before 1 t.u. and thus we are rewarded by at least 3 energy credits. If the sporadic does not occur before x = 2, we get 6 energy credits, and we can switch to 1 which increases energy by 2. This ensures winning the energy game, see Fig. 11 for a graphical representation of the winning region. The set of winning state computed by the HyTech program can be used to determine the minimal initial credit for each possible initial state: for example energy ≥ 3 is necessary for the initial condition x = 0, y = 2.) Now assume α = 4. The previous strategy is not winning any more. However, the result of the HyTech program is now: energy > 4 (for x = 0, y = 2 as initial state.) In this case, while the minimal (infimum) initial credit is 4, there is no strategy realizing this value; the game cannot be won with an initial credit of 4 but rather with any value strictly above 4. Note that this information is collected by our symbolic algorithm but not by the operator liftc as this operator is defined using inf, sup operators. 
